Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman once noted that free immigration cannot coexist with a welfare state. A welfare state with open borders might turn into a haven for poor immigrants, which would place such a fiscal burden on the state that native-born voters would support less-generous benefits or restricted immigration, or both. And yet a welfare state with an aging population might welcome young skilled immigrants. The preferences of the native-born population toward migration depend on the skill and age composition of the immigrants, and migration policies in a political-economy framework may be tailored accordingly. This book examines how social benefits-immigrations political economy conflicts are resolved, with an empirical application to data from Europe and the developed countries, integrating elements from population, international, public, and political economics into a unified static and dynamic framework. Using a static analytical framework to examine intra-generational distribution, the authors first focus on the skill composition of migrants in both free and restricted immigration policy regimes, drawing on empirical research from EU-15 and non-EU-15 states. The authors then offer theoretical analyses of similar issues in dynamic overlapping generations settings, studying not only intragenerational but also intergenerational aspects, including old-young dependency ratios and skilled-unskilled conflicts. Finally, they examine overall gains from or costs of migration in both host and source countries and the race to the bottom argument of tax competition between states in the presence of free migration.
The ongoing process of increased integration of national economies, culminating in the single European market of 1992, still leaves as virtually separate the national fiscal systems. In this book international economists Jacob Frenkel and Assaf Razin join forces with public finance economist Efraim-Sadka to provide a new treatment of international taxation, one that focuses on the interactions between fiscal policies of sovereign nations and the magnitude and directions of international capital and goods flow in an integrated world economy. They unfold a lucid and clear analysis of the implications of tax competition, tax harmonization, capital flight, external imbalances, and the terms of trade for the design of efficient national tax systems. The book extends concepts developed in Frenkel and Razin's Fiscal Policies and the World Economy and includes a theory of taxation in an open world economy.
International Taxation in an Integrated World presents the stylized facts and concepts and outlines the main issues of international taxation and the implications for the international movements of goods and capital. It reviews the principles of international taxation and international macroeconomics, analyzes the international transmission of various tax and budget policies, and provides a rigorous analysis of optimal open economy tax policy in an integrated world economy. Special emphasis is placed on the interdependence between direct and indirect taxes and on the international allocation of saving, investment, and production.
In The Decline of the Welfare State, Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka use a political economy framework to analyze the effects of aging populations, migration, and globalization on the deteriorating system of financing welfare state benefits as we know them. Their timely analysis, supported by a unified theoretical framework and empirical findings, demonstrates how the combined forces of demographic change and globalization will make it impossible for the welfare state to maintain itself on its present scale.
In much of the developed world, the proportion of the population aged 60 and over is expected to rise dramatically over the coming years—from 35 percent in 2000 to a projected 66 percent in 2050 in the European Union and from 27 percent to 47 percent in the United States—which may necessitate higher tax burdens and greater public debt to maintain national pension systems at current levels. Low-skill migration produces additional strains on welfare-state financing because such migrants typically receive benefits that exceed what they pay in taxes. Higher capital taxation, which could potentially be used to finance welfare benefits, is made unlikely by international tax competition brought about by globalization of the capital market. Applying a political economy model and drawing on empirical data from the EU and the United States, the authors draw an unconventional and provocative conclusion from these developments. They argue that the political pressure from both aging and migrant populations indirectly generates political processes that favor trimming rather than expanding the welfare state. The combined pressures of aging, migration, and globalization will shift the balance of political power and generate public support from the majority of the voting population for cutting back traditional welfare state benefits.
From Malthus to Becker, the economic approach to population growth and its interactions with the surrounding economic environment has undergone a major transformation. Population Economics elucidates the theory behind this shift and the consequences for economic policy.Razin and Sadka systematically examine the microeconomic implications of people's decisions about how many children to have and how to provide for them on population trends and social issues of population policy. The authors analyze how these decisions affect labor supply, consumption, savings and bequests, investments in human capital, and economic growth, along with related new issues such as migration and income redistribution across generations, in an integrated microeconomic framework.Population Economics is a thoroughly modern treatment of population economics as a field in public economics. It integrates and extends Marc Nerlove's Household and Economy: Welfare Economics of Endogenous Fertility, as well as work written jointly with colleagues that has appeared in various journals and other publications.
The effects of a government's budget on society and the political economy are of considerable concern to economists as well as to consumers and taxpayers. The original contributions in this book analyze all of the budget's components expenditures, revenues, the deficit - with a special emphasis on issues that have assumed increasing importance over the last decade or so, such as intergenerational transfers of debt and declines in corporate tax revenues.
Chapters deal with both microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of the effects of budgets, and demonstrate how budgetary policies affect inflation, efficiency, the balance of payments, exchange rates, and the decision-making process.
The contributions are grouped into five sections. The first covers the revenue side of the budget - taxation policy and its interaction with emigration, corporate tax revenues, personal income taxes, and fiscal policies. The second takes up intergenerational transfers, consumption decisions, and Ricardian equivalence and neutrality. Budget deficits and optimal policies, inflation and its relationship to budget deficits are examined in parts three and four.
The book concludes by looking at stabilization in open economies, and includes treatments of the consequences of balance-of-payments crises, exchange rate management under uncertainty, and foreign exchange operations.
Elhanan Helpman, Assaf Razin, and Efraim Sadka are professors of economics at Tel-Aviv University.