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Martin Shubik

Martin Shubik is Seymour Knox Professor of Mathematical Institutional Economics (Emeritus) at Yale University’s Cowles Foundation and School of Management.

Titles by This Author

This is the third and last volume of Martin Shubik's exposition of his vision of "mathematical institutional economics"—a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using strategic market games and other game-theoretic methods.

There is as yet no general dynamic counterpart to the elegant and mathematically well-developed static theory of general equilibrium. Shubik's paradigm serves as an intermediate step between general equilibrium and full dynamics. General equilibrium provides valuable insights on relationships in a closed, friction-free economic structure. Shubik aims to open up this limited structure to the rich environment of sociopolitical economy without dispensing with conceptual continuity.

Volume 1 of this work deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multiperiod finite- and infinite-horizon economies. Volume 3 considers the specific roles of financial institutions and government, aiming to provide the link between the abstract study of invariant economic and financial functions and the ever-changing institutions that provide these functions. The concept of minimal financial institutions is stressed as a means to connect function with form in a parsimonious manner.

This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"—a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy.

Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.

This is the second volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"—a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy.

Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.

Concepts and Solutions

Winner of the 1983 Lanchester Prize of the Operations Research Society of America

This book by a recognized authority on game theory and its applications introduces social scientists in a variety of disciplines to this powerful methodology. The emphasis throughout is on the empirical approach to model building and testing within the context of real-world situations.

Martin Shubik, who has made numerous applications of game theory to economics and the social sciences as well as significant contributions to the fundamental development of the subject, is Seymour H. Knox Professor of Mathematical Institutional Economics at Yale University. The second volume of Game Theory in the Social Sciences, A Game Theoretic Approach to Political Economy was published by The MIT Press in 1984.