This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will. Using careful arguments and ingenious thought-experiments, the author exposes familiar preconceptions and hobbling institutions. The essays are grouped into four sections: Intentional Explanation and Attributions of Mentality; The Nature of Theory in Psychology; Objects of Consciousness and the Nature of Experience; and Free Will and Personhood.
About the Author
Daniel C. Dennett is University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (MIT Press) and other books.
"The problems that Daniel Dennett addresses in his essays are crucial ones for philosophy and contemporary science. With a sure touch and a great deal of insight, he has subjected to analysis questions that lie at, or perhaps just beyond, the frontiers of the scientific study of mind and brain. Dennett's work should help guide progress in the understanding of the profound and troubling issues that have intrigued and perplexed critical minds for many centuries. His work is stimulating and impressive...."